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I. Introduction

Mary Nobles Hancock’s Note evaluates two conflicting federal
circuit decisions on the constitutionality of legislative prayer.1 She
thus bravely chose to explore what one scholar has called an
“Establishment Clause Train Wreck.”2 Although in the strict sense
I’m a volunteer too, in reality that’s not so. Once Ms. Hancock
asked me to comment on her Note, how could I gracefully refuse?
Oh, I had sufficient grounds had I wanted to assert them—the
main one being that I’m no expert on the issue of legislative
prayer.3 But I accepted the invitation regardless. My hope was that
as a non-expert, I might be able to offer a useful, or at least
interesting, perspective.4 If some readers believe I am mistaken, I
appeal to them for charity. The late Yale Law Professor Arthur Leff
said we commonly assign those who disagree with us into one of
the “usual residuary categories—ignorance, insanity and evil.”5 If
that’s where I end up in some peoples’ estimation, I hope they’ll
recall I provided advance warning of the challenge my lack of
expertise presents.6
1. Mary Nobles Hancock, Note, God Save the United States and this
Honorable County Board of Commissioners: Lund, Bormuth, and the Fight Over
Legislative Prayer, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 399 (2019). Legislative prayer is “[t]he
practice of opening governmental sessions with prayer.” Kenneth A. Klukowski,
In Whose Name We Pray: Fixing the Establishment Clause Train Wreck Involving
Legislative Prayer, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219, 221 (2008).
2. Klukowski, supra note 1.
3. Before reading Ms. Hancock’s Note, I was unfamiliar with constitutional
jurisprudence regarding the specific topic of legislative prayer. I did, however,
have a general understanding of the original meaning of the Establishment
Clause. See, e.g., Samuel W. Calhoun, Separation of Church and State: Jefferson,
Lincoln, and the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., Show It Was Never Intended
To Separate Religion From Politics, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 459, 465–70
(2018) (arguing that the Founders did not intend to separate religion from
politics); Samuel W. Calhoun, May the President Appropriately Invoke God?
Evaluating the Embryonic Stem Cell Vetoes, 10 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION ONLINE
1, 6–16 (2009) (opining that the idea of a separation between church and state is
mischaracterized by scholars).
4. Another motivation for accepting was to support the Student Notes
Colloquium, one of the law school’s most innovative and significant events. It’s
not common for student work to be recognized in the format of an academic
conference.
5. Arthur Allen Leff, Law and Technology: On Shoring Up a Void, 8
OTTAWA L. REV. 536, 543 (1976).
6. For why my lack of expertise doesn’t necessarily connote ignorance, see
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Part II, after noting the complexity of this issue, briefly
comments on Ms. Hancock’s analysis, which focuses on how
current Supreme Court doctrine should be applied to legislative
prayer. Part III ranges more broadly. My basic position is that the
Supreme Court has long misconstrued the Establishment Clause.
This misinterpretation in turn has led the Court mistakenly to
interpose itself into the realm of legislative prayer, an incursion
the Founders never intended.
II. Ms. Hancock’s Note
A. Complexity of the Issue
Upon first reading Lund and Bormuth, I was struck by how
each federal circuit’s litigation history is the mirror image of its
counterpart. In Lund, the Fourth Circuit litigation, the federal
district court found the County Commission’s prayers to be
unconstitutional.7 A Fourth Circuit panel reversed in a 2–1 split
decision, finding the prayers to be constitutional.8 The Fourth
Circuit en banc, in a 10–5 split decision, reversed the panel’s
holding, reinstating the district court’s determination that the
prayers were unconstitutional.9 Bormuth, the Sixth Circuit
litigation, followed a parallel course to the opposite conclusion. The
federal district court found the County Commission’s prayers to be
constitutional.10 A Sixth Circuit panel reversed in a 2–1 split
decision, finding the prayers to be unconstitutional.11 The Sixth
Circuit en banc, in a 9–6 split decision, reversed the panel’s
holding, reinstating the district court’s determination that the
prayers were constitutional.12
supra note 3.
7. Lund v. Rowan County, 103 F. Supp. 3d 712 (M.D.N.C. 2015).
8. Lund v. Rowan County, 837 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2016).
9. Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Judge J.
Harvie Wilkinson III, the dissenter from the Fourth Circuit panel decision,
authored the majority opinion for the Fourth Circuit en banc.
10. Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 850 (E.D. Mich. 2015).
11. Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 849 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2016).
12. Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
Judge Richard Griffin, the dissenter from the Sixth Circuit panel decision,
authored the majority opinion for the Sixth Circuit en banc.
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I’ve mentioned six opinions: two district court opinions, two
federal circuit panel opinions, and two en banc federal circuit
opinions. These six opinions total 221 pages, representing the
views of thirty-two federal judges. The overall figures on the
Establishment Clause question? Regarding number of pages, I
count 104 for unconstitutionality and 117 for constitutionality.
Regarding number of judges, I count seventeen for
unconstitutionality and fifteen for constitutionality.13 Given these
close tallies, I think it’s safe to say the constitutionality issue is
unusually challenging. How is a newcomer like me supposed to
make sense of it? Ms. Hancock’s excellent Note is a great starting
point.
B. Ms. Hancock’s Analysis
Ms. Hancock’s Note provides a very helpful entry point into
this complicated subject. She first does a superb job of concisely
and accurately conveying both the general history of Supreme
Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence14 and the two
governing Supreme Court decisions on the specific issue of
legislative prayer.15 Next, she clearly presents the two conflicting
federal circuit decisions,16 highlighting how the Sixth Circuit in
Bormuth rejects the four factors identified as dispositive by the
Fourth Circuit in Lund.17 To this point, Ms. Hancock’s Note is
largely descriptive. Even had she stopped there, the Note would
have make a valuable contribution. Providing a clear roadmap
through confusing terrain is a worthy accomplishment in itself.
13 I counted each judge only once. Thus, I didn’t double-count those
appellate judges who served on the circuit panels.
14 Hancock, supra note 1, at 11–17.
15 Id. at 21–32. The two Supreme Court decisions discussed are Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) and Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565
(2014).
16. Hancock, supra note 1, at 32–44.
17. Id. at 38–44. The en banc Lund decision, in its unconstitutionality ruling,
emphasized “the commissioners . . . [as] exclusive prayer-givers; the consistent,
singular faith of the prayers; the commissioners’ invitation for the meeting
attendees to participate in the prayers; and the local government setting.” Id. at
38. The en banc Bormuth decision, in its ruling upholding Jackson County’s
prayer practices, believed these factors had no significance “in assessing the
constitutionality of . . . legislative prayer.” Id. at 42–44.
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But the Note does more than describe. Ms. Hancock also
carefully evaluates whether Lund’s four factors18 for evaluating
legislative prayer reflect the values the Supreme Court stressed in
Marsh—the “societal value in honoring tradition”19—and Town of
Greece—“inclusivity.”20 She discusses additional values as well,
including lending gravity,21 inviting reflection on democratic
ideals,22 and avoiding coercion.23 Ms. Hancock concludes that
Lund’s four factors are helpful in implementing all five of these
important values.24 Consequently, other courts should reject
Bormuth’s approach25 and instead utilize Lund’s four factors until
the Supreme Court rules on the issues presented.26
Ms. Hancock’s Note reflects what she rightly conceived to be
her principal task—to evaluate the extent to which the conflicting
circuit court decisions accord with existing Supreme Court
precedent, in this instance two prior decisions that were
necessarily authoritative for the Fourth and Sixth Circuits. But
the last time I looked, I was not a sitting federal circuit judge. Not
being a federal judge I am sure has certain downsides, but there is
an important upside as well—I can range more freely regarding
the issue of legislative prayer. In particular, I am not compelled to
conform my views to Supreme Court precedent.
III. Legislative Prayer Is Inappropriate for Establishment Clause
Scrutiny
I will begin my broader inquiry by agreeing with two insights
from the late-Justice Scalia. First, he lamented that a certain
notion regarding the Constitution has “gained currency,”meaning
18. Supra note 17 and accompanying text.
19. Hancock, supra note 1, at 76, 79.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 50.
22. Id. at 50, 58, 79.
23. See id. at 65, 67, 75 (noting that people “uncomfortable with the prayer
may feel pressured to follow along”; that there is a perceived threat of allocating
“benefits or burdens . . . based on participation”; and audience members could be
intimidated “into participation”).
24. Id. at 56–59, 62, 68–69, 77–79.
25. Id. at 54–55, 61–62, 66–67, 74–75.
26. Id. at 77–80.
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“that if something is intensely bad, it must be prohibited by the
Constitution; or if intensely desirable, it must be required by the
Constitution.”27 Second, Scalia decried the theory of an evolving
Constitution, for example, the belief that the goal of constitutional
interpretation is to determine what the Constitution ought to say,
rather than discern what the document objectively says according
to its original meaning28—“the most plausible meaning of the
words of the Constitution to the society that adopted it.”29
But what is objectionable about an evolving Constitution?
Here I will rely not on Scalia, but on the late Justice Byron White:
“[D]ecisions that find in the Constitution principles or values that
cannot fairly be read into the document usurp the people’s
authority, for such decisions represent choices that the people have
never made and that they cannot disavow through corrective
legislation.”30 In other words, “ill-grounded constitutional
adjudication thwarts democratic self-government.”31 And, given an
27. Justice Antonin Scalia, The Idea of the Constitution, Alexander
Meiklejohn Lecture at Brown University (April 1991), in ANTONIN SCALIA, SCALIA
SPEAKS: REFLECTIONS ON LAW, FAITH, AND LIFE WELL LIVED 157, 164 (Christopher
J. Scalia & Edward Whelan eds., 2017). To Scalia, the original Constitution’s
oblique acquiescence in slavery demonstrates that it’s “plainly unhistorical . . . to
regard the Constitution as simply a shorthand embodiment of all that is perfect.”
Id.
28. Id. at 165; Justice Antonin Scalia, Original Meaning, Speech at the
Attorney General’s Conference on Economic Liberties (June 14, 1986), in SCALIA,
supra note 27, at 180, 183.
29. Scalia, Original Meaning, supra note 28, at 183.
30. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
787 (1986) (White, J., dissenting), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992). “Conversely, ‘[b]ecause the Constitution itself is ordained and
established by the people of the United States, [properly grounded] constitutional
adjudication . . . does not . . . frustrate the authority of the people to govern
themselves through institutions of their own devising and in accordance with
principles of their own making.’” Samuel W. Calhoun, Justice Lewis F. Powell’s
Baffling Vote in Roe v. Wade, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 925, 962 n.184 (2014)
(quoting Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 787).
31. Calhoun, supra note 30, at 962. This conclusion reflects the view that
majority rule prevails except when the majority is denied political power via
constitutional protection accorded to enumerated individual rights. Thus,
majority rule is the norm. To me, this is the most logical constitutional
accommodation between group power and individual rights. The late-Professor
Arthur Leff, however, someone I admire immensely, disagreed.
Leff acknowledges constitutional duality. “[T]he Constitution clearly says that
there are circumstances in which the collective may override the normative beliefs
of a bare numerical minority, and other circumstances in which one biological
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ill-grounded holding, who would be usurping the peoples’ right to
govern themselves? The Supreme Court, of course, which Scalia
called “an anti-majoritarian institution if there ever was one.”32
What I have said so far presumably reveals my perspective—I
believe that the Supreme Court, exemplifying the evolving
Constitution in action, routinely has wrongly interpreted the
Establishment Clause. Before turning to the specific issue of
legislative prayer, I will first substantiate this assertion with
Establishment Clause decisions focusing on other issues.

individual is entitled to withstand everyone else . . . .” Arthur Allen Leff,
Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1248 (1979). He also
accords to the Constitution the authority to proclaim who wins: “The Constitution
as God says, in effect, that one wins out over the other when it, the Constitution,
says so, and not when the individual or group says so.” Id. But Leff believes the
Constitution doesn’t “exhaustively specify which circumstances are which.” Id.
When the Constitution says nothing about a particular situation, he considered
it arbitrary, given other possible resolutions, to designate the collective as the
winner. Id. at 1248–49.
As much as I admire Leff, I disagree with him here. Given the Constitution’s
structure—with principal articles establishing majority rule and a Bill of
[enumerated] Rights protecting individuals, the default rule should accord power
to the majority unless precluded by an explicitly protected individual right. This
result is not an arbitrary disposition of power to the majority, but instead the
natural consequence of the document’s organization. This view is further
supported by the history of the Bill of Rights, a document that many viewed as
essential to prevent the new federal government from encroaching upon
fundamental individual liberties. RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE
MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 341–42, 409–10 (2009). Given this
historical backdrop, there is nothing arbitrary in concluding that everything the
Bill of Rights does not protect against legislative interference is still subject to
normal democratic processes.
It may be of interest to note that Leff’s constitutional views are what he called
“the lawyer’s dog to be wagged by the enormous preceding tail” of his article. Leff,
supra note 31, at 1230, 1245. The “tail” was an extended, now famous, discourse
on whether there exists “a complete, transcendent, and immanent set of
propositions about right and wrong, findable rules that authoritatively and
unambiguously direct us how to live righteously.” Id. at 1229. For my evaluation
of Leff’s conclusions, see Samuel W. Calhoun, Grounding Normative Assertions:
Arthur Leff’s Still Irrefutable, but Incomplete, “Sez Who?” Critique, 20 J.L. &
RELIGION 31 (2004–05).
32. Scalia, supra note 27, at 165.
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A. Establishment Clause General Misinterpretations

In Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township,33
the Supreme Court first “applied the Establishment Clause to the
states through incorporation via the Fourteenth Amendment.”34
Putting aside the issue of whether incorporation was appropriate
at all,35 Everson, which “marked the beginning of the . . . Court’s
modern era of Establishment Clause jurisprudence,”36 made an
exceptionally poor start in terms of fidelity to history. This is
highly regrettable, for such faithfulness is indispensable for
interpreting the Constitution according to its original meaning.37
Everson’s bottom-line holding is that “the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of
separation between church and State.’”38 The Court’s source for the
phrase, “wall of separation,” is Reynolds v. United States,39 which
in turn quoted Thomas Jefferson’s 1802 letter to the Danbury
Baptist Association.40 Reynolds was the first Supreme Court
decision to rely upon Jefferson’s description of the First
33. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
34. Hancock, supra note 1, at 407.
35. Justice Clarence Thomas criticized Everson’s incorporation stance for
“glibly effect[ing] a sea change in constitutional law.” Town of Greece v. Galloway,
572 U.S. 565, 607 n.1 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring). Thomas’s specific objection
was that the Court gave insufficient consideration to federalism-based objections
to the whole concept of incorporating the Establishment Clause. Id. at 604–08.
Given that a major purpose of the Clause was to protect a State’s right to establish
a religion from federal interference, id. at 606–07, Thomas believed that
“[a]pplying the Clause against the States” prohibited precisely what the Clause
was intended to protect. Id. at 1836. I find Thomas’s view persuasive, but even
Justice Scalia, who so opposed an evolving Constitution, supra note 28 and
accompanying text, did not join this portion of Thomas’s concurrence. 572 U.S. at
603.
36. Hancock, supra note 1, at 407.
37. Supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
38. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
164 (1878)).
39. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
40. Id. at 164. The Court did not state its source for Jefferson’s letter. For
the letter itself, see Thomas Jefferson, Reply to Danbury Baptist Association (Jan.
1, 1802), in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 332
(Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944). Jefferson’s letter was a reply to an
Address submitted to him by the Danbury Baptists. From the Danbury Baptist
Association (after Oct. 7, 1801), in 35 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 407–09
(2008).
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Amendment’s purpose—“building a wall of separation between
church and State.”41 The Reynolds Court recognized that Jefferson
didn’t even attend the Constitutional Convention,42 yet
nonetheless concluded that his Danbury letter should “be accepted
almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect” of
the Amendment.43 This deference to Jefferson’s “wall of
separation” metaphor was not harmful in Reynolds itself, which
applied the Free Exercise rather than the Establishment Clause.44
The Danbury letter explicitly corroborates Reynolds’s
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause—“Congress was
deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left
free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or
subversive of good order.”45 Everson, however, misinterpreted
Jefferson’s separation metaphor in applying the Establishment
Clause.46
41. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
42. Id. at 163.
43. Id. at 164.
44. Id. at 162, 166; Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
45. 98 U.S. at 164. The Court here rephrases the language in Jefferson’s
letter that stated “the legislative powers of the government reach actions only,
and not opinions.” Jefferson, supra note 40. Jefferson’s wording in turn rephrases
the Baptists’ earlier statement to him that “no man aught to suffer in Name,
person or effects on account of his religious Opinions—That the legitimate Power
of civil Government extends no further than to punish the man who works ill to
his neighbor.” From the Danbury Baptist Association, supra note 40.
46. Infra notes 47–52 and accompanying text. The late Mark DeWolfe Howe
asserted that the Court has in numerous law and religion cases “too often
pretended that the dictates of the nation’s history, rather than the mandates of
its own will, compelled a particular decision.” MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN
AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 4 (1965). Any “superficial and purposive interpretations of the past,” as
well as any manipulations and distortions, are “a matter of consequence” when
“the Court endeavors to write an authoritative chapter in the intellectual history
of the American people, as it does when it lays historical foundations beneath its
reading of the First Amendment.” Id. Any “misreading” weaves “synthetic strands
into the tapestry of American history.” Id. Howe reminds us that although the
justices can “bind us by their law,” they aren’t “empowered to bind us by their
history.” Id. at 5. “Happily . . . each of us is entirely free to find [our] history in
other places than the pages of the United States Reports.” Id. [By the way, Howe
believes that the Supreme Court oversimplified the history of the First
Amendment. Id. at 10–11. “[T]he Court, in its role as historian, has erred in
disregarding the theological roots of the American principle of separation. The
Court’s tendency [is] to see that principle more as the reflection of a skeptic’s
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Immediately before listing numerous Establishment Clause
prohibitions, the Everson Court stated its understanding of the
Clause’s meaning: “The structure of our government has, for the
preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from
religious interference.”47 This characterization no doubt made the
Court quite comfortable, in the very next paragraph, in applying
Jefferson’s “wall of separation” metaphor to the Establishment
Clause48—a wall is needed to protect the state from religion.49 But
there is a fatal, mile-wide hole in this reasoning. In Jefferson’s
mind, a wall was needed for exactly the opposite reason50—to
protect religion from the state.51 Harvard Law Professor Noah
Feldman strongly supports this conclusion:
doubt than as the expression of a believer’s conviction . . . .” Id. at 15.
47. 330 U.S. at 15 (internal quotation omitted) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80
U.S. 679, 730 (1871)).
48. Id. at 16.
49. Contrary to this single-faceted description of the Establishment Clause’s
purpose, the Court also grounded the Clause in the need “to protect religious
minorities from persecution.” NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S
CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM—AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT 173 (2005).
Professor Feldman, however, finds this explanation unpersuasive. Id. at 173–75.
To so explain “the non-establishment movement . . . said much more about
Black’s own motives and those of his colleagues on the postwar Supreme Court
than it did about eighteenth-century America.” Id. at 174. My former colleague,
Emeritus Professor Lash LaRue, in a fascinating study of the rhetoric of judicial
decisions, argues that Justice Black’s “story” in Everson, which overemphasized
persecution in the history of the First Amendment, “is bad because it denies
respect to the religious . . . . In this story, religion threatens to produce disorder
and persecution, and an established church seems to be one of the worst
calamities ever loosed upon a suffering humanity . . . .” L.H. LARUE,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS FICTION: NARRATIVE IN THE RHETORIC OF AUTHORITY 26
(1995); id. at 18–27.
50. Professor Feldman observes that the same fate has befallen Jefferson’s
famous Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom:
Despite the fact that Jefferson’s statute said not a word about
protecting the state from the effects of religion, and a great deal about
protecting religious belief from the state, secularists have long
emphasized what they characterize as Jefferson’s secular orientation
as the key to his position on religious liberty.
FELDMAN, supra note 49, at 38; Calhoun, Separation of Church and State, supra
note 3, at 467–68.
51. In often ignored language in the Danbury letter, Jefferson “told the
Baptists that he viewed the First Amendment with reverence because ‘religion is
a matter which lies solely between man and his God, [and] that he owes account
to none other for his faith or his worship.’” Calhoun, Separation of Church and
State, supra note 3, at 467 (quoting Jefferson, supra note 40). This wording
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The crucial point for the background of the religion clauses of the
Constitution . . . is that . . . [Jefferson’s] focus was on the liberty of
conscience and the necessity of individual judgment in finding the
truth, which he feared the state might infringe. This was no
antireligious secularism . . . The focus was . . . on protecting religion
from government, not the other way round.52

It’s therefore clear that Everson, by misconstruing Jefferson’s
separation metaphor in the Establishment Clause context, laid a
false foundation for all future Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.53
“demonstrates that [Jefferson’s] wall was meant to insulate religious beliefs and
practices from legislative interference,” id., a conclusion bolstered by Jefferson’s
characterizing the First Amendment’s religion clause as an “expression of the
supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience.” Jefferson, supra
note 40. For another likely reason Jefferson chose his wall metaphor, which also
had nothing whatever to do with protecting the state from religion. Infra note 52
and accompanying text.
52. FELDMAN, supra note 49, at 40; Id. at 175. Given the context of Jefferson’s
letter, he likely also had in mind protecting “the rights of conscience,” supra note
51 and accompanying text, from an established national church. The Baptists had
flagged the risks religious establishments posed to religious freedom in their
previous Address to Jefferson—by indirectly criticizing Connecticut’s established
Congregationalist Church. They complained that “what religious privileges we
enjoy . . . we enjoy as favors granted, and not as inalienable rights: and these
favors we receive at the expence of such degrading acknowledgements as are
inconsistant with the rights of freemen.” Danbury Baptist Association, supra note
40. Philip Hamburger explains this language: “Baptists had to sign certificates as
to their minority status in order to avoid paying taxes for support of the
Congregationalist religious majority in each town, and therefore Baptists
resented the establishments and looked to Jefferson for support.” PHILIP
HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 156 (2002). Professor Feldman
reminds us, however, that “it is absolutely correct to say that the First
Amendment to the federal Constitution was drafted so that it would not apply to
the states when it was enacted.” FELDMAN, supra note 49, at 48. This means the
First Amendment did nothing to interfere with existing state religious
establishments, a fact of which Jefferson was well aware. DANIEL L. DREISBACH,
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 50
(2002); see Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1805), in
WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 40, at 339, 341 (noting that religion’s free
exercise “is placed by the constitution independent of the powers of the general
government”; Jefferson therefore left the issue of suitable religious exercises “as
the constitution found them, under the direction and discipline of State or Church
authorities acknowledged by the several religious societies”).
53. The late Chief Justice Rehnquist shared this criticism of Everson: “It is
impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding
of constitutional history, but unfortunately [via Everson] the Establishment
Clause has been expressly freighted with Jefferson’s misleading metaphor for
nearly 40 years.” Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Rehnquist’s answer was to “frankly and explicitly” abandon the “wall
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Two examples demonstrate that the Court’s Establishment
Clause decisions since Everson have bungled history in additional
ways. First, Professor Feldman convincingly criticizes the former
requirement that a practice must have had a secular purpose to
pass muster under the Establishment Clause:54
“Secularism” in the contemporary sense was a term unknown to
the framers and unmentioned by the Reconstruction Congress
that drafted the 14th Amendment . . . Yet in 1963, in an opinion
stating respectfully that “the place of religion in our society is
an exalted one,” the Supreme Court was prepared to hold, with
precious little historical precedent, that the Constitution
required government to act with a “secular” purpose and that
civic practices deeply ingrained in American life would have to
be eliminated.55

Second, Justice Scalia pointed out that the Establishment
Clause had never been thought to prohibit “a government policy of
favoritism toward religious practice in general.”56 He backed this
up with a host of examples, including presidential Thanksgiving
proclamations expressing gratitude to God and publicly paid
chaplains for the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the
military.57 Yet, “in 1973, in contradiction of our entire national
history,” the Court imposed a “principle of neutrality,” for example,
“the government could not show favoritism to religion.”58
I imagine that right now those who’ve read Ms. Hancock’s
Note are puzzled by my argument. My critique thus far has been
that the Supreme Court has distorted American history in its
Establishment Clause decisions.59 But isn’t this a strange
of separation” metaphor. Id. at 107. My answer is to apply the metaphor as
Jefferson actually meant it. See supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text; infra
notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
54. FELDMAN, supra note 49 at 181–82. The “secular purpose” requirement’s
most well-known embodiment is as part of the “Lemon test,” referring to Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
55. FELDMAN, supra note 49, at 181–82. The decision in question was School
District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
56. Antonin Scalia, Interpreting the Constitution, Parliament House
Address, Sydney, Australia (Aug. 1994), in SCALIA, supra note 27, at 188, 190–91.
57. Id. at 191.
58. Id. (internal citations omitted). Justice Scalia didn’t name the 1973
decision, but presumably it was Committee for Public Education & Religious
Liberty v. NyQuist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973).
59. See supra notes 33–58 and accompanying text.
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argument to make in the specific context of legislative prayer? Ms.
Hancock demonstrates that both Marsh and Town of Greece,
precisely because of legislative prayer’s pervasive presence over
two centuries of American public life, exempted the practice from
normal Establishment Clause constraints on government action.60
How then can I justify criticizing Marsh and Town of Greece as
wrongly decided?
I’ll explain momentarily, but not before mentioning something
that makes me very uneasy about the stance I’ve taken. As already
stated, in Lund the Fourth Circuit found the particular legislative
prayer in question to be unconstitutional.61 The author of the
majority opinion is J. Harvie Wilkinson III,62 who’s the antithesis
of an “evolving Constitution” judge. Consider these three
statements from his book, Cosmic Constitutional Theory: Why
Americans Are Losing Their Inalienable Right To Self -Governance,
a title that clearly signals Wilkinson’s position: (1) “[L]iving
constitutionalism is a complete inversion of democratic primacy
and turns the Constitution’s foremost premise of popular
government on its head;”63 (2) “[W]hen judges take it upon
themselves to update the Constitution in the name of the popular
will, they deprive all ‘participants, even the losers, the satisfaction
of a fair hearing and an honest fight;’”64 and (3) “[L]iving
constitutionalism is paternalism, premised on the belief that [the]
very few know what is best for [the] very many, which is to say us
all.”65
Because Judge Wilkinson rejects an evolving Constitution, one
must read his Lund opinion as not only submitting to Marsh and
Town of Greece’s authority to interpret the Establishment
Clause,66 but also accepting them as historically correct.67 It makes
60.
61.
62.
63.

Hancock, supra note 1, at 414, 420.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
Id.
J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY
AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF—GOVERNANCE 20
(2012). I think it’s appropriate to treat “living” as synonymous with “evolving.”
64. Id. at 26.
65. Id. at 32.
66. Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 276, 278, 287 (4th Cir. 2017) (en
banc).
67. A concurring judge explicitly asserts that the majority decision “comports
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me uneasy to disagree with such an eminent jurist, especially
because he lives nearby in Charlottesville and is a dear friend of
my recently retired colleague, Emerita Professor Ann Massie. I’m
emboldened to do so only because of my own firm belief that the
Supreme Court has thoroughly botched the history of the
Establishment Clause, especially regarding its interpretation of
Jefferson’s “wall of separation” metaphor.68 That conviction, plus
the likelihood I’ll never be personally involved in a case before the
Fourth Circuit.
B. Establishment Clause Legislative Prayer Misinterpretations
So why do I believe the Supreme Court’s legislative prayer
jurisprudence is mistaken? First, as previously stated, Everson
started the Court’s Establishment Clause analysis on the wrong
foot by misconstruing Jefferson’s “wall of separation” metaphor.69
Rather than invoking separation to protect religion from the state,
as Jefferson intended, the Court invoked separation to protect the
state from religion.70 Had Jefferson’s conception of separation been
correctly applied from the outset, legislative prayer would’ve later
never been subjected to Establishment Clause scrutiny. How does
legislative prayer potentially implicate the state in damaging
religion?71

with . . . the history of the Establishment Clause.” Id. at 292 (Motz, J.,
concurring).
68. See supra notes 38–52 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text.
71. Jefferson’s other likely concern was to protect individual consciences
from infringement by an established national church. See supra note 52. Although
in Everson the Court, via Fourteenth Amendment incorporation, declared itself
empowered to read the First Amendment as also prohibiting state religious
establishments, 330 U.S. at 15, one can’t rightly impose that expanded meaning
upon Jefferson himself, who knew that the First Amendment as enacted didn’t
restrict state religious establishments. See supra note 52. Consequently, if one
seeks in good faith to ground an interpretive approach to the First Amendment
upon Jefferson’s own views, one should invoke only his concerns about an
established national church. This would necessarily mean that to Jefferson the
Establishment Clause would be inapplicable to legislative prayer in state
settings. Prayers opening state legislative sessions or county commission
meetings obviously have nothing to do with establishing a national church.
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If the Court, rather than focusing on Jefferson’s individual
perspective, had evaluated legislative prayer under the
Establishment Clause as the Founders meant it, the clear result
would’ve still been “no violation.” The Clause’s chief purpose was
to prohibit Congress from establishing a national church. This was
the Senate’s view in the early 1850’s, when it rejected a challenge
to Congressional chaplains.72 Professor Feldman agrees with the
Senate’s position.73 Given Everson’s incorporation of the
Establishment Clause against the States, one would naturally
expect that Marsh, in assessing the constitutionality of legislative
prayer, would’ve focused on whether the practice establishes a
state religion.74 Had the Court done so, the quick answer should’ve
been “no.” Legislative prayers “bear no resemblance to the coercive
state establishments that existed at the founding.”75 Regardless of
their form, such establishments used the law to coerce: “They
exercised government power . . . to exact financial support of the
church, compel religious observance, or control religious
doctrine.”76 Because “actual legal coercion [is what] counts,”77 the
“‘subtle coercive pressures’” associated with legislative prayer
don’t create “an Establishment Clause violation.”78
Marsh, however, rather than evaluating chaplaincies based on
the coercive characteristics of state establishments, instead upheld
them based on a broad historical argument —chaplaincies had
been around from the time of the First Amendment,79 and they

72. The Senate believed the practice didn’t violate the Establishment Clause
because “a rule permitting Congress to elect chaplains is not a law establishing a
national church.” Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 789 n.10 (1983).
73. The Establishment Clause was intended to prohibit “a national
establishment.” FELDMAN, supra note 49, at 42. Feldman later states that the
“Clause guaranteed that the [federal] government would not compel anybody to
support any religious teaching or worship with which he conscientiously
disagreed.” Id. at 48–50. To me, these two assertions are inconsistent in that the
second seems a broader prohibition than the first.
74. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 607–08 (2014) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
75. Id. at 608
76. Id.
77. Id. at 609–10.
78. Id.; see infra note 105.
79. 463 U.S. at 786, 788, 792, 795.
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therefore must be constitutionally permissible.80 The Court,
however, should’ve grounded its argument in the main purpose of

80. Id. at 792, 795. The framers “were supremely untroubled by norms like
the opening of legislative sessions with symbolic prayers.” FELDMAN, supra note
49, at 50. Although legislative prayers were certainly the norm, I take issue with
Professor Feldman’s adjective, “symbolic,” if by that term he means “pro forma”
or “insincere.” The prayers of that era were much more than symbolic. Although
not a legislative prayer, George Washington’s 1789 Thanksgiving Proclamation
is germane to this issue because of its relevance to the original meaning of the
Establishment Clause. On September 25, 1789, the very day that Congress
reached “final agreement . . . on the language of the Bill of Rights,” the House also
“resolved to request the President to set aside a Thanksgiving Day to acknowledge
‘the many signal favors of Almighty God.’” Marsh, 463 U.S. at 788, n.9. President
Washington issued the proclamation on October 3, 1789. George Washington,
Thanksgiving Proclamation (Oct. 3, 1789), in BASIC WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 565 (Saxe Commins ed., 1948). The seriousness of Washington’s
prayer is evident throughout. Among other things, he asserted (a) “the duty of all
Nations to acknowledge the providence of Almighty God;” (b) called the American
people to thank “the beneficent Author of all the good that was, that is, or that
will be” for a variety of things, including “the favorable interpositions of his
providence, which we experienced in the course and conclusion of the late war”;
and (c) urged prayers to beseech
the great Lord and Ruler of Nations . . . to pardon our national and
other transgressions, to enable us all, whether in public or private
stations, to perform our several and relative duties properly . . . [and]
to render our national government a blessing to all the People, by
constantly being a government of wise, just and constitutional laws.
Id. (infra Appendix, sentences 1–4, respectively). Washington’s prayer wasn’t
merely a symbolic performance. A single fact makes this irrefutably clear—the
overwhelming evidence that Washington personally credited God for His
“favorable interpositions” during the Revolutionary War. See, e.g., RICHARD
BROOKHISER, FOUNDING FATHER: REDISCOVERING GEORGE WASHINGTON 146 (1996)
(crediting God for his victory at Monmouth); RON CHERNOW, WASHINGTON: A LIFE
335 (2010) (crediting God for the French alliance); id. at 384 (crediting God for his
successful thwarting Benedict Arnold’s treachery); NATHANIEL PHILBRICK: IN THE
HURRICANE’S EYE: THE GENIUS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE VICTORY AT
YORKTOWN xiv–xv (2018) (crediting God for allowing that all “the pieces”
necessary for victory “finally fell into place”). In his first inaugural address,
Washington summed up his perspective:
No People can be bound to acknowledge and adore the invisible hand,
which conducts the Affairs of men more that the People of the United
States. Every step, by which they have advanced to the character of an
independent nation, seems to have been distinguished by some token
of providential agency.
George Washington, First Inaugural (April 30, 1789), in BASIC WRITINGS, supra
at 558, 559.
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the Establishment Clause—chaplaincies are permissible because
they don’t establish a state church.81
Because Marsh ultimately found no constitutional violation,82
isn’t it immaterial that the Court applied the wrong rationale? Not
at all. After holding that the bare fact of legislative prayer didn’t
violate the Establishment Clause,83 the Marsh Court considered
other possible objections, one of which was that the prayers were
in the Judeo -Christian tradition.84 The Court held that a prayer’s
content wasn’t of concern to judges so long as “the prayer
81. See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. The historical argument
has some logical flaws in the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation context. The
fact that many states had chaplaincies discloses nothing about lawmakers’ views
concerning a potential Establishment Clause violation. Prior to Everson in 1947,
that clause didn’t even apply to the states. Consequently, until that year,
legislatures could’ve created state chaplaincies without regard to the First
Amendment. It’s therefore unpersuasive to argue that pre - 1947 state
chaplaincies demonstrate that state lawmakers found them permissible under
the Establishment Clause.
82. The late Chief Justice William Rehnquist believed that by the
Establishment Clause the Framers meant to forbid not only “establishment of a
national religion,” but also “preference among religious sects or denominations.”
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see id. at
113. “Given the ‘incorporation’ of the Establishment Clause as against the States
via the Fourteenth Amendment in Everson, States are prohibited as well from
establishing a religion or discriminating between sects.” Id. at 113. Even if
Rehnquist were correct about this supplemental purpose, it would be wrong to
interpret the Establishment Clause as barring preferential treatment to
Christianity versus other religions or no religion. As previously noted, the House
petitioned Washington to issue a Thanksgiving Proclamation on the same day it
approved the wording of the Bill of Rights. See supra note 80. President
Washington’s proclamation doesn’t explicitly mention Christianity, but it’s clear
he meant the Christian God in referring to “Almighty God,” “beneficent Author,”
and “the Great Lord and Ruler of Nations.” Supra Appendix, para. 1. In his
Circular to the States, “a formal message to the thirteen governors that [he issued
as] the Commander in Chief,” BROOKHISER, supra note 80, at 148, Washington
concluded by expressing his “earnest prayer” that God “would most graciously be
pleased to dispose” the governors and all citizens “to do Justice, to love mercy,
and to demean ourselves with that Charity, humility and pacific temper of mind,
which were the Characteristicks of the Divine Author of our blessed
Religion . . . without [which] . . . we can never hope to be a happy Nation.” George
Washington, Circular to the States (June 8, 1783), in BASIC WRITINGS, supra note
80, at 488, 498. The title, “Divine Author,” unmistakably refers to Jesus Christ.
BROOKHISER, supra note 80; Samuel W. Calhoun, Getting the Framers Wrong: A
Response to Professor Geoffrey Stone, 57 U.C.L.A. L. REV. DISCOURSE 1, 6 n.34
(2009).
83. 463 U.S. at 792.
84. Id. at 793.
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opportunity . . . [isn’t] exploited to proselytize or advance any one,
or to disparage any other, faith or belief.”85 What’s the basis of
these additional requirements as a constitutional mandate? I
believe they’re a prime example of the evolving Constitution at
work. Marsh demonstrates the insidiousness of a malady I’ll call
“American Evolving Constitutionalism.”86 Even though the Court
strove for fidelity to history, it failed in the end—the Court couldn’t
resist supplementing the historical record with its own policy
views. If Marsh had instead focused on the principal purpose of the
Establishment Clause in an incorporation context—prohibiting an
established state church—prayers violating the Court’s
proscriptions would’ve been constitutionally unobjectionable
because they’re a far cry from the coercive characteristics of state
establishments.87
Marsh’s added proscriptions reveal a Court posed to censor
legislative prayers, but Town of Greece demonstrates a censorship
risk far beyond the factors Marsh singled out for disapproval.
Consider how Town of Greece describes the approved purposes for
legislative prayer: “lend[ing] gravity to public business,
remind[ing] lawmakers to transcend petty differences in pursuit of
a higher purpose, and express[ing] a common aspiration to a just
and peaceful society.”88 Nothing in this list even necessarily
connotes a prayer. Reflecting upon the Preamble to the
Constitution would admirably serve the same three goals. This fact
85. Id. at 794–95. Town of Greece agrees with these prohibitions. See Town
of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 579–584 (2014).
86. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. I wasn’t thinking of
Professor Arthur Leff when I coined this phrase. Nonetheless, I assume my doing
so was inspired by the impression left years ago from reading Leff’s brilliant
critique of economic analysis of the law, an “academic theory” he labeled
“American Legal Nominalism” because “its basic intellectual technique” was to
substitute “definitions for both normative and empirical propositions.” Arthur
Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA.
L. REV. 451, 459 (1974). Leff was tempted by an alternative label,
“Econominalism,” but rejected it as “barbaric.” Id. at 459 n.26. For the same
reason, I rejected “American Constitutional Evolutionism” as the name of the
interpretive approach I join the late - Justice Scalia in criticizing.
87. See supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text. This isn’t to say that any
such legislative prayers would be a good thing. See infra notes 90–93 and
accompanying text.
88. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 575. The Court later expressed another
legitimate purpose for legislative prayer—“acknowledging the central place that
religion, and religious institutions, hold in the lives of those present.” Id. at 591.
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alone shows that the Court had in mind a watered-down notion of
prayer.89
What about prayers that don’t conform to the Court’s narrow
conception, i.e., those aimed at more than “elevat[ing] the purpose
of the occasion and . . . unit[ing] lawmakers in their common
effort”?90 The Court expressly disapproved of three possible prayer
objectives: “denigra[ting] nonbelievers or religious minorities,
threaten[ing] damnation, or preach[ing] conversion.”91 What could
possibly be wrong with proscribing such prayers? Wouldn’t prayers
with these characteristics be very unwise in a public meeting? Yes,
but “foolishness” shouldn’t be equated with “constitutionally
forbidden.” Doing so isn’t appropriate doctrinally.92 In addition,
foolishness has cures other than judicial censorship.93
The Town of Greece standard has the potential to censor a
much broader range of prayer content. The majority opinion
reflects tension in the Court’s reasoning. On the one hand, being
nonsectarian isn’t a requirement of constitutionality.94 “Once it
invites prayer into the public sphere, government must permit a
prayer giver to address his or her own God or gods as conscience
dictates, unfettered by what an administrator or judge considers
to be nonsectarian.”95 On the other hand, the restriction just
described still applies. Therein lies the problem. The evaluative
standard is subjective and malleable. Who knows what might
cause a court to brand a particular prayer as exceeding its
“legitimate function”?96 Judges could certainly differ on what
counts as a “[p]rayer that is solemn and respectful in tone, [one]
that invites lawmakers to reflect upon shared ideals and common

89. The Court’s sanctioned purposes are commendable in themselves, but
they still evince a constricted idea of prayer.
90. Id. at 583. These are worthy goals. But see supra note 89 and
accompanying text.
91. Id.
92. Because the Establishment Clause, properly interpreted, doesn’t
prohibit legislative prayer. See supra notes 69–81 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 102–112 and accompanying text.
94. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577–84.
95. Id. at 582. Ministers shouldn’t be required “to set aside their nuanced
and deeply personal beliefs for vague and artificial ones.” Id.
96. Id. at 583.
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ends before they embark on the fractious business of governing.”97
How, for example, would a court likely rule on prayers calling on
God to forgive our corporate and individual sins, as George
Washington did in 1789?98 And what if someone emulated
Washington by thanking God for favorably intervening in past
problems faced by the locality in question?99 It’s easy to envision a
court’s deciding that such prayers exceed the “brief
acknowledgment of . . . belief in a higher power” that Town of
Greece sanctioned.100
Town of Greece, although repudiating some bases for
censorship, still grants the judiciary discretion to censor broadly.
In a nation that historically has greatly valued religious liberty,
judges shouldn’t be policing individuals’ prayers.101 This is
particularly the case because there’s another way to handle the
challenges presented by legislative prayer.

97. Id.
98. See infra Appendix; supra note 80. I’m not focusing here on whether it’d
be wise to include this plea in a legislative prayer. The issue is whether the
Constitution, properly interpreted, would forbid one’s doing so. The same point
applies to any subject of prayer. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
99. We’ve seen that Washington undeniably believed in such “favorable
interpositions of [God’s] providence.” See infra Appendix, sentence 3; supra note
80. Keep in mind that Washington’s Thanksgiving Proclamation was issued in
response to a House request made the very day Congress approved the final
language of the First Amendment. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 n.9
(1983); supra note 80.
100. 572 U.S. 565, 590–92 (2014). The two examples of prayer the Court
recounts suggest that these particular judges would have no constitutional
objection to such a prayer. See id. at 570–74. That outcome, however, is uncertain
even for these jurists, and who knows how another court might rule.
101. Professor Feldman observes that prohibiting legislative prayers by paid
public officials “can be defended by saying that the government is just limiting
what its employees can say or do in the exercise of their official capacities.”
FELDMAN, supra note 49, at 284 n.4. See Hancock, supra note 1, at 9–10 (prayer
by such an official would be “government speech” not subject to protection under
the Free Exercise Clause). In my view, the government shouldn’t be able to curtail
how any person prays, public official or not. Consider President George W. Bush’s
Remarks on September 14, 2001 at the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance
Service (which I’m treating as in effect a prayer), which Professor Feldman
describes as “[s]uffused with as much theology as any presidential address since
Lincoln’s second inaugural.” FELDMAN, supra note 49 at 241. It would’ve been
outrageous had Congress or a court tried to limit what President Bush could say
on such an occasion.
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IV. Conclusion
My main objective has been to show that the Founders didn’t
intend legislative prayer to be subjected to judicial oversight via
the Establishment Clause.102 The Supreme Court, relying on
history, accorded legislative prayer special Establishment Clause
treatment, but, having succumbed to “American Evolving
Constitutionalism,”103 it unfortunately still imposed significant
restraints. A better solution would be to allow those giving
legislative prayers to grapple with the challenges presented. They
could then decide whether a change in prayer practices was
warranted. This approach admittedly might sometimes call for
forbearance and toleration from those who object to particular
legislative prayers. But there’s evidence suggesting that
Americans have these qualities.
A very early example shows Americans’ ability to
accommodate exposure to prayers thought to be objectionable.
Marsh notes that two delegates to the First Continental Congress
opposed beginning with prayer because “the delegates . . . ‘were so
divided in religious sentiments . . . that [they] could not join in the
same act of worship.’”104 Nonetheless, an opening prayer was given
after Samuel Adams “stated that ‘he was no bigot, and could hear
a prayer from a gentleman of piety and virtue, who was at the same
time a friend to his country.’”105
Regarding the practical potential for change in prayer
practices, Town of Greece relates how Nebraska’s chaplain dropped
“‘all references to Christ’ after a Jewish lawmaker complained.”106
This step reflected “the practical demands placed on a minister
102.
103.
104.
105.

See supra notes 69–81 and accompanying text.
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 791 (1983).
Id. at 792 (quoting CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, FAMILIAR LETTERS OF JOHN
ADAMS AND HIS WIFE ABIGAIL, DURING THE REVOLUTION 37–38 (1876)). On the
general subject of unease based on differing beliefs, Professor Feldman points out
that it’s “largely an interpretive choice to feel excluded by the fact of other people’s
faith.” FELDMAN, supra note 49, at 242. Feldman wouldn’t countenance coercion,
id., a charge that’s also levied against legislative prayer. I oppose coercion too,
but I agree with Town of Greece’s refutation of this characterization of legislative
prayer. 572 U.S. at 588–592; see supra text accompanying notes 75–78. Ms.
Hancock disagrees. Hancock, supra note 1, at 67–68; supra note 23.
106. 527 U.S. at 580 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 n.14).
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who holds a permanent, appointed position in a legislature and
chooses to write his or her prayers to appeal to more members, or
at least to give less offense to those who object.”107 Judge Jeffery
Sutton, concurring in the Sixth Circuit’s en banc Bormuth decision,
supported a similar approach regarding legislative prayer. How
should a prayer be worded?
Good manners might have something to say about all of this and
how it is done. So too might the Golden Rule. But the United
States Constitution does not tell federal judges to hover over
each town hall meeting in the country like a helicopter parent,
scolding/revising/okaying the content of this legislative prayer
or that one.108

With the United States’s growing religious diversity,109 those
giving legislative prayers likely will increasingly be led, either by
“practical demands” or “[g]ood manners” or “the Golden Rule,” to
modify their prayer practices to be more inclusive.110 This process
will undoubtedly be slow and halting, with many objectionable
107. Id. Whether a Christian pastor should’ve dropped all references to Christ
is a complicated question. See Calhoun, supra note 3, at 463 n.11. Rather than
taking this step, the Nebraska chaplain could’ve instead invited the Jewish
lawmaker to give an opening prayer, with complete freedom to pray in the Jewish
tradition.
108. Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 521 (Sutton, J., concurring).
109. Professor Feldman notes “the increasing presence of other non-Christian
minorities, and an attendant atmosphere of religious multiculturalism.”
FELDMAN, supra note 49, at 45. It’s interesting that Feldman also emphasizes the
significance of religious diversity to the protection accorded freedom of conscience
in the American Founding. Id. at 43–44. In fact, “Madison believed that religious
diversity itself, not the Bill of Rights, was most important: ‘[W]ithout religious
diversity to ensure nonestablishment from the practical standpoint, a
constitutional amendment would do no good, since it would be ignored by the
majority.’” Samuel W. Calhoun, If Separation of Church and State Doesn’t
Demand Separating Religion from Politics, Does Christian Doctrine Require It?,
74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 565, 580 n.73 (2019) (quoting FELDMAN, supra
note at 45).
110. As I’ve already suggested, supra note 107, being more inclusive doesn’t
necessarily require self-censorship regarding the particulars of one’s own faith.
Consider also Professor Feldman’s description of what happened at the National
Day for Prayer and Remembrance following the 9/11 attacks. After President
George W. Bush gave a Christian-Protestant themed address, “he was followed in
the pulpit not only by the dean of the [Episcopalian Washington National]
[C]athedral but also by the Roman Catholic archbishop of Washington, D.C., an
African-American Methodist minister, Billy Graham, a rabbi, and an iman who
recited verses from the Qur’an.” FELDMAN, supra note 49, at 241.
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legislative prayers along the way. But recall Justice Scalia’s point
emphasized previously. The fact that something is undesirable
doesn’t mean it’s prohibited by the United States Constitution.111
In the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation context, the
Establishment Clause was meant only to prohibit an established
state church. Legislative prayer most assuredly doesn’t threaten
this result. Consequently, any problems such prayer presents
should be resolved like people of good will should always handle
their differences—by struggling to find the right balance between
fidelity to their own beliefs while simultaneously showing respect
to those with whom they disagree.112
Appendix
George Washington Thanksgiving Proclamation113
City of New York, October 3, 1789
[1] Whereas it is the duty of all Nations to acknowledge the
providence of Almighty God, to obey his will, to be grateful for his
benefits, and humbly to implore his protection and favor, and
Whereas both Houses of Congress have by their joint Committee
requested me “to recommend to the People of the United States a
day of public thanks-giving and prayer to be observed by
acknowledging with grateful hearts the many signal favors of
Almighty God, especially by affording them an opportunity
peaceably to establish a form of government for their safety and
happiness.”
[2] Now therefore I do recommend and assign Thursday the
26th day of November next to be devoted by the People of these
111. See supra notes 27, 98–99 and accompanying text. Similarly, a practice’s
desirability doesn’t mean it’s constitutionally required. Id. For example, I like
Judge Wilkinson’s suggested “Message of Religious Welcome” in the Lund panel
decision, which makes clear that members of all religious faiths are welcome at
County Commission meetings. Bormuth, 837 F.3d at 431. But for the reasons this
Comment explains, I don’t think the Constitution requires such a statement.
112. As a Christian who has sometimes been called upon to pray publicly in a
secular setting, I’ve had to grapple with such issues myself.
113. Washington, Thanksgiving Proclamation (Oct. 3, 1789), in BASIC
WRITINGS, supra note 80, at 565. This proclamation resulted from a House request
made the very day Congress approved the First Amendment’s final language.
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 788 n.9; supra notes 80, 99 and accompanying text.

508

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 485 (2019)

States to the service of that great and good Being, who is the
beneficent Author of all the good that was, that is, or that will be.
[3] That we may then all unite in rendering unto him our
sincere and humble thanks, for his kind care and protection of the
People of this country previous to their becoming a Nation, for the
signal and manifold mercies, and the favorable interpositions of
his providence, which we experienced in the course and conclusion
of the late war, for the great degree of tranquility, union, and
plenty, which we have since enjoyed, for the peaceable and rational
manner in which we have been enabled to establish constitutions
of government for our safety and happiness, and particularly for
the national One now lately instituted, for the civil and religious
liberty with which we are blessed, and the means we have of
acquiring and diffusing useful knowledge and in general for all the
great and various favors which he hath been pleased to confer upon
us.
[4] And also that we may then unite in most humbly offering
our prayers and supplications to the great Lord and Ruler of
Nations and beseech him to pardon our national and other
transgressions, to enable us all, whether in public or private
stations, to perform our several and relative duties properly and
punctually, to render our national government a blessing to all the
People, by constantly being a government of wise, just and
constitutional laws, discreetly and faithfully executed and obeyed,
to protect and guide all Sovereigns and Nations (especially such as
have shown kindness unto us) and to bless them with good
government, peace, and concord. [5] To promote the knowledge and
practice of true religion and virtue, and the [i]ncrease of science
among them and Us, and generally to grant unto all Mankind such
a degree of temporal prosperity as he alone knows to be best.

